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Abstract
We develop a model of securitized (Originate, then Distribute) lending in which both publicly
observed aggregate shocks to values of securitized loan portfolios, and later asymmetrically ob-
served discernment of the qualities of subsets thereof, play crucial roles, as in the recent paper of
Bolton, Santos and Scheinkman (2010). Unlike in their framework, we find that originators and
potential buyers of such assets may differ in their preferences over timing of trades, leading to
a reduction in the aggregate surplus accruing from securitization. In addition, heterogeneity in
agents’ selected timing of trades – arising from differences in their ex ante beliefs - coupled with
high leverage, may lead to financial crises, implying uncoordinated asset liquidations inconsistent
with overall (inter-temporal) market equilibrium. We consider and contrast mitigating regula-
tory policies, such as leverage restrictions and corresponding ex ante resale price guarantees on
securitized asset portfolios. We show that the latter performs strictly better than the former, by
ensuring not only bank survival, but also enhancing the social surplus arising from securitized
lending, in a better coordinated equilibrium.
∗We are grateful to Patrick Bolton, Pete Kyle, Frederic Malherbe, and the seminar participants at AXA-FMG
conference, European Finance Association Meetings and University of Zurich. All errors are our responsibility.
1. Introduction
Securitization, via sales of portfolios of long-maturity loans originated by banks to market-based
institutions funded using longer maturity liabilities (often aided by implicit governmental sup-
port) has been a key part of reality in US as well as other developed financial markets for quite a
long time. The presumed benefits arising from such activity are due, in addition to much greater
cross-sectional diversification in the resulting portfolios backing securities, to “inter-temporal di-
versification” owing to which institutions with longer-maturity debt claims are less vulnerable to
any (short-term) aggregate shocks impacting on the current market values of assets supporting
payoffs on these. Hellwig (1998) was one of the first to emphasize such a role for securitization, in
a context of inter-temporal variations in economy-wide interest rates impacting on interim values
of long-maturity loan assets, given fixity of originating banks’ short-maturity liability claims, and
of the returns (interest rates) on their loans.
However, it was only in the previous decade, of “financial innovation”, that we have witnessed
explosive expansion in the securitization of bank-originated lending based on securitization of
credit-backed asset portfolios of a far broader quality spectrum, culminating in an even more
implosive crash leading to a broad-based financial cum economic crisis, considered to be the
worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s. These included credit card debt-based portfolios
of varying qualities, and mortgage- backed portfolios with much higher debt to value ratios (also
less borrowers’ income information), all subject to potential losses arising from sectoral shocks
- plus their “spillovers” into the broader economy - with origins beyond economy-wide interest
rate shocks, and their impact on the valuation of payoffs on assets that were largely devoid of
default risk, at least in the aggregate. In addition, the financing of various quasi-independent
entities providing funding for such securitization was based on quite complex “tranching” of
the payoffs arising from the asset/loan portfolios which backed up these liabilities, leading to
non-transparency vis-a-vis their risks.1
In essence, this phase of rapid expansion of securitization - of at least ostensibly lower risk
tranches of portfolios based on bank-originated loans of heterogeneous qualities, and potentially
lower average value than at origination - remained still-born, at or just before the near-closure
(flow-wise) of these markets in late 2008. As Adrian and Shin (2009a) have noted, the share of
Asset Based Securities (ABS) held by intermediaries with high and short-maturity leverage ratios
- investment banks, banks and sponsored investment vehicles - was about two-third at the end of
2008, with the remainder held by mutual and pension funds, as well as insurance companies et al.
1When securitized (loan) portfolios, to be sold by their originating agents to others, do contain payoff (default)
risks which may be mitigated by better ex ante screening and ex post monitoring by the originators, there is an
obvious role for some degree of such tranching of their ex post payoffs. For example, originating agents holding on
to their lowest priority (equity) tranches, would serve to better incentivize such screening cum monitoring, while
disposing of their higher priority tranches would enable them to divest other risks connected to the future interim
market valuations of these assets.
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In the process, as securitization markets exploded over 2002-2007 (new issuance sharply slowed
over 2007-8, following bad news on some securitized funds), their funding by the investing firms
was provided largely via increases in leverage ratios, either directly as with the investment banks,
or within “off the book” special purpose entities sponsored by the larger commercial banks, quite
often in the form of short-maturity (overnight) Repos.
Subsequently, declines in the market valuations of these underlying asset portfolios, coupled
with asymmetric information on their qualities leading to Lemons issues vis-vis mutually accept-
able prices, led to collapses in these markets. These in turn led to the possibility - in some cases
reality - of Runs on these investing firms, leading to both higher spreads on their Repo rates,
as well as enhanced “haircuts”, or margins, on such repo financing. Gorton and Metrick (2009)
have documented these crisis-induced phenomena across securities, as well as inter-bank, mar-
kets. One of their key findings, elaborated on in Gorton and Metrick (2010), was that post-crisis
effects on spreads and haircuts also occurred, albeit to a lesser extent, in securitization markets
other than those backed by sub-prime mortgage backed assets, including on credit-card receiv-
ables based portfolios. On the other hand, the impact on rates and haircuts was much lower
for corporate bonds, which are held largely by investors with either no fixed liabilities, or those
of longer maturities. In particular, yield differentials on industrial bonds of differing categories
(AAA vs BBB) widened in the financial crisis of 2008-9 to a far lesser extent, than those on
banks’ ABS (asset based securities).
These circumstances, and findings, have clearly called for a systematic program of research,
on the functioning and potential vulnerabilities of a “market based banking” system, in which
banks with specialized expertise originate, package, and distribute portfolios of securities to other
financial market participants. In the initial stage of a very rapid expansion of such markets, only
a few firms may have had the required expertise to evaluate risks associated with such portfolios,
to create tranches of these varying in seniority and risk for sale to the ultimate investors, such as
pension funds and insurance firms. During this phase, many securities remained in the portfolios
of these specialized entities, investment banks and the sponsored investment vehicles and conduits
of large commercial banks. This was associated with large increases in their leverage, often of
a short-term nature. The resulting increase in funding for the originated assets was often also
associated with increases in the prices of such assets in the short run – Adrian and Shin (2009b)
– allowing for easy refinancing of loans made to finance these, so that repayment risks pertinent
to their affiliated credit-backed portfolios were difficult to judge (as compared to on corporate
bonds), by outside rating agencies as well as by the suppliers of short-term funding to the
initial portfolio holders. But, ultimately, when these asset price “bubbles” proved not to be
sustainable, the resulting shocks led to values of securities based on loans made to finance such
assets collapsing, leading to deleveraging and huge drops in their prices. Shin (2009) provides an
outline of such a process of credit expansion and collapse; on pioneering earlier work on this set
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of themes, see especially Geanakoplos (2010).
Several recent papers have amplified and elaborated on micro-economic foundations for bank
behavior and “systemic risk” - of asset price declines and potential bank failures - in these
settings. Acharya, Shin, Yorulmazer (2010), and Stein (2010), have examined this process further,
by characterizing banks’ ex ante portfolio choices, over risky long-term loans vs risk-free liquid
assets. Liquidity for the purchase of the long-maturity assets of banks, which are sold to service
their debts in low return states, is provided by a combination of other banks which have surplus
liquidity, as well as by outside investors who are less efficient at realizing value from these assets.
Both sets of authors emphasize the externalities on asset prices arising from such inefficient
liquidation, that an individual bank may ignore in making its ex ante portfolio choice. Stein
focuses on the ostensible liquidity premium (cheaper short-term debt) banks may obtain, with
excessive investment in illiquid assets to be sold later at a discount to outside investors in a
bad state of nature, whereas Acharya et al emphasize that an originating bank’s full return on
long-term assets/loans would not be “pledgeable” to facilitate additional interim financing, to
stave off such asset sales in adverse states.
In contrast to these papers, in which an originating institution sells its longer-term as-
sets/loans only in the low individual or aggregate return state, attempting to avert default,
Bolton, Santos and Scheikman (2010) develop and analyze another model in which securitization
of originated assets to markets is an ongoing, and essential, part of the investment process in
longer-maturity and potentially risky assets. The market participants who are potential buyers
of these assets ascribe higher values to them than their originators do, at least contingent on an
aggregate value-reducing shock, which leads the originating institutions to consider selling their
assets. Their focus is on endogenizing the timing of these asset sales, by short-run (SR) to long-
run (LR) investors, during the time interval following upon such an aggregate shock. Over that
period, originators (specialized interim holders) of securitized assets come to know more about
their qualities, in terms of prospective future payoffs, of subsets within their holdings. Then, if
they had not sold all of their holdings at the start of this stage, their asset market price would
come to reflect their incentive to sell only those assets about which they have bad news, or at
best no idiosyncratic news beyond the public aggregate shock. Indeed, Bolton et al (hereafter
BSS) make a very strong assumption that, for the subset of an SR’s assets on which she has
received good news, there is no longer any wedge between their values as perceived by SR vs LR
investors. Hence, given that the LR investors face an opportunity cost of holding liquidity to
buy such assets, there are no gains to be realized via SR agents trading good assets with LRs.
Building on the last observation, BSS then show that whenever a Delayed trading equilibrium
- in which SRs wait until asymmetric information is (thought to be) prevalent, and then sell only
their “bad” and “no new information” assets to LRs - does exist, despite a “lemons discount” in
its equilibrium market price, it Pareto dominates an Early trading equilibrium, for both SR and
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LR agents, in an ex ante sense. It is also associated with relatively higher equilibrium origination
of the long-maturity (risky) asset by SR agents, coupled with greater outside liquidity provision
by LR investors. Thus, the overall thrust of their conclusions is in sharp contrast with those
of Acharya et al (2010), and Stein (2010). In discussing policy implications of their model in a
companion paper, BSS (2009), they suggest that when the Delayed trading equilibrium might
not exist – owing to the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets for LR agents, coupled with
prices reflecting asymmetric information about the qualities of assets to be sold therein - the
role of government policy ought to be that of providing a price subsidy to restore its existence,
complementing private purchasers.
Despite the richness of its framework, and the elegance of its analysis, these BSS conclusions
leave many issues unanswered, and raise other questions. There is, for example, no clear “tipping
point” at which a Crisis arises, besides when SR agents discover that there is no delayed trading
equilibrium price at which they are willing to trade medium quality assets, about which they
have no additional news beyond the initial and public value-reducing aggregate shock.2 In reality,
significant doubts about the sustainability of high and safe (flow) returns on sub-prime mortgage-
backed securities arose by mid-2007, while the realization of a financial crisis, with sharply
enhanced haircuts and yields, related to credit granted based on such assets, did not materialize
until mid-2008. During this long interval, there were also reports of some (investment) banks
divesting, or at least curtailing purchases of, mortgage-backed securities, so uniform co-ordination
on a (potential) Delayed Trading equilibrium is far from evident. Rather, it suggests to us
the possibility of developing differences in opinion among SR agents, about the (medium-term)
likelihood of continuation of a benign state for mortgage-backed securities as a whole, leading to
their making differing choices on the timing of trades in these assets, an outcome infeasible in
BSS (2010). Furthermore, the leverage choices made by SR agents who chose not to divest their
risky asset portfolios early, plays no role whatsoever in their model.
For these reasons, concerning our beliefs regarding relevant modeling precepts, and our sense
that SR agents’ possibly divergent (from 2007 onwards) beliefs, regarding the likelihood of an
adverse shock to values of sub-prime mortgage-backed securities as a whole, had an important
impact on their choices of timing of trade on the extant holdings thereof, as well as future invest-
ments in these, we develop an alternative analysis otherwise in the spirit of the BSS framework.
In sharp contrast to them, we assume that the valuation wedge that arises between SR and
LR agents, following upon an adverse aggregate shock, applies to all asset subsets, irrespective
of their heterogeneous qualities as discerned by SRs; Chari et al (2010) assume the same in a
2Indeed, in all of the numerical examples of BSS (2010) in which a Delayed Trading equilibrium does exist -
and Pareto dominates the Early trading equilibrium - it is only the LR agents who gain strictly, as a result of
incurring lower opportunity costs of providing outside liquidity to SRs. It appears to us to be more than a trifle
ironic, to base their theory of financial crises on the unanticipated non-existence of the Delayed equilibrium for
other parameter values, on the part of SR agents who ostensibly adopt such a trading strategy, despite expecting
No strict gains relative to trading earlier!
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reputation-based secondary market model.3 We examine the potential existence of both delayed
and early trading equilibria, as in BSS (2010), and agents’ preferences over these. We show,
in opposition to the BSS conclusions, that LR agents are always worse off in a delayed trading
equilibrium whenever it exists, as compared to in the early trading equilibrium for the same
exogenous parameters. SR agents, on the other hand, may be better off in such a delayed trading
equilibrium, but that is the case only if their ex ante prior, regarding the likelihood of the benign
aggregate state continuing - the adverse aggregate shock not occurring - is above an interior
threshold level. In essence, sufficiently “exuberant” ex ante beliefs are essential for the delayed
trading equilibrium to be preferred by (some) SRs. As in BSS (2010), such an SR-preferred
delayed trading equilibrium is associated with (weakly) higher investment in the long-term risky
asset, and lower (indeed zero) holding of inside liquidity by SRs. However, the overall surplus
from asset origination and trading, summed across SRs and LRs, is strictly lower in our de-
layed, as compared to early, trading equilibrium, a result yet again in sharp contrast with the
conclusions reached by BSS (2009, 2010).
We then consider, again consistent with our view of empirical reality, a scenario in which a
subset of (optimistic/exuberant) agents, who ascribe a lower likelihood to the adverse aggregate
shock arising, make their trading and investment choices based on the delayed trading strategy,
whereas other SR (as well as LR) agents, who are less optimistic, make their trades immediately,
even before the aggregate shock has arisen. Such immediate trading plays a key role in our model,
unlike in BSS (2010). We use this scenario to sketch a plausible process for a Financial Crisis,
in which some ”price discovery” from immediate trading by a subset of SR and LR agents serves
to provide a basis for Leverage choices of other SR agents, who plan to trade later in a Delayed
trading equilibrium, as outlined above. We then show that even small changes in the beliefs of the
less optimistic LR agents, hence its impact on their offered immediate trading prices, may lead
to (Repo) Runs by the short-term creditors of optimistic SRs, even before an adverse aggregate
shock has realized, which is a pre-condition for any type of trading in BSS (2010). The resulting
asset sales, by these SR agents who had planned to trade a proper subset of their assets in a
Delayed equilibrium, leads then to a “market meltdown”, prior to a stage in which idiosyncratic
asymmetric information about subsets of their held assets has accrued to SRs. The market then
collapses, and stays that way. In other words, adverse selection pertinent to delayed trading
serves to provide a backdrop for, rather than the immediate triggering mechanism in, a process
3BSS (2010) assume that such a payoff valuation wedge, across SRs and LRs, disappears for subsets of assets
discerned (asymmetrically by SR agents) to be of the highest quality. They base this precept on the assumption
that the aggregate shock to asset payoffs has absolutely no impact on this subset. To us, this assumption seems
more like a notational simplification, rather than a compelling one. As long as even these subsets are subject to
some likelihood of paying off less than their maximum levels, conditional on an adverse aggregate shock, outside
providers of leveraged financing to SRs who retain such assets would demand equity injections to ensure the safety
of their debt, as with asset subsets subject to higher likelihoods of low payoffs. That would, in turn, lower their
overall pledgeable value to investors, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000), owing to greater rent extraction by bank
(SR) ”insiders”. Further, under asymmetric information mere retention, chosen by them, can not signal quality.
6
of financial crisis. Unanticipated non-existence of an equilibrium plays no role at all.4
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide an overview of the model in
BSS (2010), emphasizing the departure point for our extension of it. Section III deals with our
characterization of manifolds of early and delayed trading equilibria in our setting. Section IV
develops the implications of mis-coordination - across SRs’ trading strategies and leverage choices
- for financial crises. In Section V we consider and contrast two key policy interventions: leverage
restrictions and guaranteed ex ante resale price supports, both of which can mitigate the impact
of such mis-coordination. In Section VI, we conclude, making further comparisons with some
recent literature.
2. The Model
In this Section we present the “originate and distribute” model, inspired by BSS (2009). In
contrast to the model of BSS, where the assets may pay off early, in our model the assets do
not pay off until the terminal date. We further demonstrate that this departure from BSS has
significant effect on the structure of equilibrium, which has rich implications for understanding
the financial crises, as discussed in Section 5.
2.1. Outline and motivation for “originate and distribute”
There are four dates, t = 0, . . . , 3, and two classes of agents, with different investment opportunity
sets and intertemporal preferences. Thus, there are potential gains from trade, as outlined in
the Introduction and discussed below. The timing and extent of this trade, and the equilibrium
consequences on initial portfolio choices and welfare, is the focus of the analysis. Agents place
their initial investments at t = 0 and may engage in trade at the early and late interim dates,
t = 1, 2. All assets pay off by t = 3 at the latest.
Short-run (SR) agents are uniquely capable of originating long-maturity risky assets, but
ascribe a lower valuation to holding such assets to maturity if the economy is “shocked”5 than
the other set of agents in the model, Long-run (LR) investors. One can think of SR agents
as representing banks that are funded with short term liabilities. LR agents can be thought
of as pension and other investment funds that are funded with longer-duration liabilities and
hence are less concerned with the interim fluctuations of risky assets. As a result, there are
4See also Heider et al (2010) for a model of inter-bank markets, a la Bhattacharya and Gale (1987), which may
fail to function due to asymmetric information across banks about the quality of their (collateral) assets. Hellwig
(2008) cautions all modellers, of financial crises in a market based banking system, to take into account not just debt
and ”excessive maturity transformation”, but also other dimensions of what he terms ”market malfunctioning”.
As an example, he refers to risk-assessment, and ensuing leverage choices, by SR agents predicated on observed
price volatility prior to any adverse aggregate shock. Our notion of ex ante leverage choices based on offered - but
not taken, by optimistic SR agents - immediate trading prices, is based on the same notion, but amplifies it via
linking it to inter-temporal trading strategy choices.That serves to resolve Hellwig’s justified baﬄement, regarding
the extent of price declines on asset based securities, which defied any reasonable payoff projections.
5In the sense of an economy-wide, or non-diversifiable, negative liquidity shock.
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potential gains from trade to be had from SRs selling risky assets that they originate on to LRs
at one of the interim dates. However, LRs face opportunity costs associated with holding cash,
to enable them to buy SR-originated assets. This arises in the form of alternative long-term
investments that pay off at t = 3. These alternative investments have diminishing marginal
returns, implying that LRs face increasing marginal costs with respect to holding cash. Trade
can also be impaired by adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970) with respect to the quality of SRs
assets in a shocked economy. Both sides are aware of the potential trading opportunities that
may arise at the interim dates and make their date 0 portfolio choices - over cash and long-term
assets – taking these anticipated trades, and the rationally conjectured market equilibrium prices
associated with these, into account.
2.2. Details and notation
There is a continuum, with measure 1, of each class of agents. All SRs are endowed with one unit
of cash, while LRs are endowed with K units. Cash earns no interest. In addition to holding on
to their cash, each agent can invest in a long term asset, depending on their type. The long-term
assets available to SRs have uncertain payoffs, while the long-term investments available to LRs
have deterministic payoffs. All agents of the same class are symmetric and we focus on symmetric
rational expectations equilibria. Denote by m ∈ [0, 1] the amount an SR invests in risky assets
and by M ∈ [0, K] the amount an LR invests in the deterministic long-term asset. Equilibrium
levels are denoted by a ∗ superscript.
SRs investment opportunity set and preferences : As shown in the tree depicted in Figure 1,
the risky assets available to SRs pay off ρ > 1 with probability λ at t = 1. Alternatively, the
economy is “shocked.” In this case, a risky asset continues until t = 2 whereupon it enters one
of three states. In the good (alternatively, bad) state, which occurs with conditional probability
of qη (alternatively, q − qη), the payoff at t = 3 will be ρ (alternatively, 0). In the neutral state,
which thus occurs with conditional probability 1 − q, the payoff at t = 3 is ρ with conditional
probability η or 0 with conditional probability 1 − η. The state of an asset held by an SR at
t = 2 is her private information. All probabilities are nontrivial: λ, q, η ∈ (0, 1).
To be clear, at t = 1 all SRs risky assets move in lockstep and the state of the world with
respect to these assets is common knowledge. In contrast, if the economy is shocked at t = 1,
risky assets evolve independently of each other at t = 2 and the state of any risky asset held by
an SR is then her private information. Since there is a continuum of SRs, there is no aggregate
uncertainty. Furthermore, all SRs hold well diversified portfolios of risky assets, meaning that if
at t = 1 the economy is shocked then at t = 2 each SR has a deterministic proposrtion of the
risky assets in the good, bad, and neutral states according to the probabilities above. That is,
the proportions of good, bad, and neutral assets are given by qη, q − qη, 1− η, respectively.
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Figure 1: The Time Line of the Events.
SRs seek to maximize
piSR(C1, C2, C3) = C1 + C2 + δC3, (1)
where Ct is an SR’s cash flow at date t and δ ∈ (0, 1).
LRs investment opportunity set and preferences : The long term asset available to LRs has a
liquidation value of 0 at t = 1, 2 and a positive payoff at t = 3 determined by F (I), where I is
the amount invested. The “production function,” F , is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and
satisfies the Inada conditions. It also has F ′(K) > 1, ensuring that even minute amounts of cash
involves an opportunity cost for LRs. In turn, this implies that LRs would only carry cash if
they could buy SRs risky assets cheaply (below the actuarially fair value) in some state of the
world. LRs seek to maximize
piLR(C1, C2, C3) = C1 +C2 + C3. (2)
Gains from trade: The discounting of t = 3 cash flows by SRs, but not LRs, generates
potential gains from trade at one of the interim dates.
The actuarially fair value of a unit of the risky asset in the shocked state at t = 1 is ηρ. The
model is set up so that this remains the actuarially fair value of the asset in all of the subsequent
non-endnodes shown in Figure 1, for example, at t = 2 before information has arrived or if an
asset is in the neutral state. However, the value of the risky asset to an SR at any of these nodes
is only δηρ.
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Note that SRs private information at t = 2 gives rise to a potential adverse selection problem
with respect to trading at this date, which could be avoided by trading at t = 1. The price that
will be achieved, though, from trading at either date will have to be determined in equilibrium
and will depend on the equilibrium amount of cash carried by LRs.
The (securitization and) selling of the SRs investments in risky assets is central to the model.
In particular, it is assumed that
A1. λρ+ (1− λ)δηρ < 1.
A2. λρ+ (1− λ)ηρ > 1.
The first assumption (A1) implies that the expected payoff to an SR from holding the risky asset
all the way to t = 3 is less than what the SR would get from holding cash. (A2) says that the
expected payoff from the risky asset is larger than that of cash, implying that it may be socially
optimal for the risky investment to made (by the assumption that all agents are risk neutral) if
they can be transferred to LRs. To generate such trade, it is necessary that LRs opportunity
cost of holding cash is not “too large.” The precise condition we assume is stated below [(A3)],
after we discuss trading at t = 1 versus t = 2.
Assumptions (A1) and (A2) that generate the originate and sell (securitize) feature of the
model also constrain λ to be in an interval
(λd, λu) ≡
(
1− ηρ
(1− η)ρ
,
1− δηρ
(1− δη)ρ
)
. (3)
Early versus delayed trade: Denote the quantity of risky assets and the price per unit an SR
sells at t = 1 (early trade) by Xe and Pe, respectively. The corresponding notation for trade at
t = 2 (delayed trade) is Xd and Pd. Given this notation, an SR’s expected payoff can be written
piSR = m+ λ(1−m)ρ+ (1− λ){XePe +XdPd) + δ(1−m−Xe −Xd)E[ρ˜3|Φ]}, (4)
where E[ρ˜3|Φ] is the per unit expected payoff to the risky assets the SR holds to t = 3 given
the expected characteristics of these, Φ. Due to the adverse selection problem at time t = 2 the
expected characteristics Φ of assets traded at time t = 2 depend on second period price Pd. In
particular, if this price is too low then only lemons are traded and hence the expected payoff is
zero.
Private information and an associated lemons problem at t = 2 gives rise to the possibility
that an SR would hold on to her good assets. If so, (4) becomes
piSR = m+ λ(1−m)ρ+ (1− λ){XePe + (1−m−Xe)[(1− qη)Pd + qηδρ]}. (5)
In this case, an SR prefers trading early if and only if Pe ≥ (1 − qη)Pd + qηδρ (all agents are
“small,” in the sense that they do not (believe they) influence market prices).
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Given a preference for early trading (Pd is sufficiently low), an SR would invest in the risky
asset at t = 0 only if Pe(1− λ) + ρλ ≥ 1. Equality of these terms is required for the SR to hold
both cash and the risky asset. Given (5) and a preference for delayed trading (Pe is sufficiently
low), an SR would invest in the risky asset at t = 0 only if [Pd(1− qη) + qηδρ](1− λ) + ρλ ≥ 1.
Our analysis in subsequent sections focuses on early versus delayed trading equilibria, where
SRs invest in risky assets and, if the economy is shocked, trades either at t = 1 or t = 2 (with δ
being sufficiently large that trade is subject to adverse selection at t = 2, i.e., only bad and neutral
risky assets would be sold). Since, conditional on a public liquidity shock, there is no aggregate
uncertainty and holding cash entails an opportunity cost, it is clear that in equilibrium, if the
economy is shocked, all of an LR’s cash holdings, M , will be used to buy risky assets. Thus, in a
conjectured early trading equilibrium (where all trade after a shock occurs at t = 1), Xe =M/Pe
and so the expected payoff to an LR is:
ΠLR = F (K −M) + λM + (1− λ)
M
Pe
ηρ. (6)
The LR optimizes by choosing M to satisfy the first order condition:
F ′(K −M∗e ) = λ+ (1− λ)
ηρ
Pe
. (7)
This simply says that the marginal cost to an LR of holding cash must equal the marginal return.
The optimal cash holding, M∗, is strictly positive if F ′(K) is sufficiently small:
A3. F ′(K) < λ+
(1− λ)2ηρ
1− λρ
.
Assumption (A3) will guarantee the existence of an early trading rational expectations equilib-
rium.
Similarly, if a delayed trading equilibrium with price Pd exists, and hence SRs at t = 2 trade
not only “lemons” but also neutral assets, the expected payoff of LR agents is given by:
ΠLR = F (K −M) + λM + (1− λ)
1− q
1− qη
M
Pd
ηρ, (8)
where (1− q)/(1− qη) is the probability of buying a neutral asset, conditional on the fact that
both bad and neutral assets are traded at t = 2. Accordingly, an LR’s first order condition in
delayed trading equilibrium is given by:
F ′(K −M∗d ) = λ+ (1− λ)
(1− q)
1− qη
ηρ
Pd
. (9)
The asset prices are then determined from market clearing conditions that equate the demand
and supply of assets at times t = 1 and t = 2.
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2.3. Comparison with BSS (2010)
The model captures that SRs (banks) may generate liquidity at an interim date by selling long-
term risky assets, but there may be a cost due to adverse selection when they most need liquidity.
SRs can potentially avoid adverse selection costs by selling at the early interim date, rather than
the late interim date, before asymmetric information develops. However, this may have other
costs, since it is costly for LRs to carry cash (by way of an opportunity cost arising from foregone
alternative investments in illiquid long-term assets). Since trade at the early interim date may
involve a larger portion of SRs risky assets being sold, early trade may be socially inferior to
late trade. Thus, there is a potential tradeoff between trading early versus late that relates to a
tradeoff between adverse selection and demand-side liquidity costs.
In their setup, BSS show that whenever early and delayed trading equilibria coexist, the
delayed trading equilibrium is socially superior. In our setup, this is not the case. Indeed, we
will argue below that the delayed trading equilibrium lacks robustness. This dramatic difference
in our conclusions and therefore also in our respective interpretations of what constitutes a crisis,
and how to respond to it, has its source in our assumption that if the economy is shocked at
t = 1, SRs risky assets do not pay off before t = 3. In contrast, BSS assume that there is a
chance that risky assets can pay off early (i.e. become perfectly liquid). Specifically, they assume
that a risky asset pays off ρ at t = 2 if it is in the good state. In our setup, the payoff of ρ will
not occur immediately, but at t = 3.
This seemingly minor difference goes directly to the tradeoff between adverse selection versus
liquidity costs that is at the heart of the model. In the BSS setup, there is no ex ante adverse
selection cost, since the lemons discount to SRs in the neutral state is simply offset by the
premium received by SRs in the bad state. Their analysis and results on early versus delayed
trading are therefore dominated by LRs’ costs of carrying cash.
In contrast, in our setup we allow for the possibility of adverse selection at t = 2 giving rise
to a deadweight cost ex ante, namely the loss from delayed cash flows from risky assets that are
in the good state at t = 2. Thus, our setup allows for a benefit from early trading, before adverse
selection arises. In our analysis, we will trace out how this affects the results. It turns out that
the impact is significant and leads to an alternative view of crises.
3. Early vs Delayed Equilibrium: Descriptions and Comparisons
In this Section we proceed to describe both early and delayed trading equilibrium, and charac-
terize the conditions under which one or the other should be expected to arise, depending on
agents’ preferences over these. Furthermore, we also highlight the differences from the structure
of our equilibria with those in BSS (2010) and provide further insights on the key characteristics
of equilibria and their robustness. It is in the characterization of delayed trading equilibrium
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that the difference between our setup and theirs emerges in a stark way. We show that, unlike
in their model, even if a delayed trading equilibrium exists in ours, it is never preferred to the
early trading equilibrium by both SR and LR agents, even weakly.
3.1. Early Trading Equilibrium
The existence of early trading equilibrium can be demonstrated along the lines of BSS, since the
timing of risky assets payoff in the good state at t = 2 does not influence early price Pe, and
since Pd in the early trading equilibrium is just chosen to guarantee the absence of coincidence
of SRs and LRs wanting to delay trading.6 Consequently, our characterization of early trading
equilibria as functions of the probability of good economic state, λ, is essentially the same as in
BSS (2010) and is summarized in the following Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. (Bolton et al). For all λ in [λd, λu), an early trading equilibrium exists, with
unit trading prices Pe, and liquidity holding levels {m,M
∗
e }satisfying:
(i) For λ < λc, m
∗ > 0, Pe(λ) =
1− λρ
1− λ
, M∗e = (1−m
∗)Pe, satisfying equation (7);
(ii) For λc ≤ λ < λu, m
∗ = 0, and M∗ = Pe(λ), again satisfying equation (7).
Proposition 1 reveals that there are two types of early trading equilibria: (i) mixed portfolio
equilibria, where SRs hold both cash and risky assets, and (ii) corner equilibria, where SRs’
cash holdings are 0. This characterization of early trading equilibria involves two segments for
probability λ, separated by boundary probability λc, in the first of which m
∗ > 0 for SRs, and
in the second of which m∗ = 0, implying M∗ = Pe. Interestingly, the early price in Proposition 1
implies that for λ ∈ [λd; λc] SRs expected surplus is piSR = 1. As is clear, in a mixed equilibrium
(when probability λ is sufficiently small) all of any strictly positive surplus, resulting from the
origination of long-maturity assets by SRs, accrues only to LRs. In contrast, if λc < λ < λu, the
economy is in a corner equilibrium in which SRs pocket some of the surplus.
Next, we turn to deriving the comparative statics for LRs’ early trading equilibrium cash
holdings M∗e and expected payoffs ΠLR as functions of the probability of good economic state,
λ. The following Corollary 1 reports the results.
Corollary 1. LR’s equilibrium cash holding M∗e (λ) and expected payoff ΠLR(λ) are strictly in-
creasing in λ for all λ ∈ [λd, λc), and strictly decreasing in λ for λ ∈ (λc, λu).
Proof: see Appendix.
The co-movement of the unit asset prices Pe(λ), and LR money holdings M
∗
e (λ), across the
set of early trading equilibria when λ is in [λd, λc), may well be thought of as the inverse of “cash
in the market pricing” (see Shin (2009) for its exposition) in that unit asset prices, and external
6This requires delayed price Pd to be chosen sufficiently small, so that SRs prefer trading at t = 1.
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(LR) liquidity holdings held in the anticipation of buying these assets following on an aggregate
shock to their value, move in opposite directions as a function (1− λ), the probability of such a
shock. The reason, of course, is that m∗ decreases, hence the quantity of the long- maturity asset
supplied by SRs, (1−m∗), increases strictly in λ, i.e., as the probability of the adverse aggregate
shock decreases. However, SRs gain nothing from that enhanced surplus!
3.2. Delayed Trading Equilibrium
In this Subsection we explore the nature of delayed trading equilibria in our economy and demon-
strate that they are substantially different from those in BSS (2010). In contrast to BSS (2010),
it turns out that there exists no set of commonly conjectured prices {Pe, Pd} such that both the
sellers (SRs) and the buyers (LRs) would prefer delayed over early trading, even weakly. Con-
sequently, we characterize delayed trading equilibria in a setting where SRs decide the timing
of trades. Specifically, a delayed trading equilibrium arises when SRs prefer delaying trading,
and hence only deliver the asset to the market at their preferred date t = 2 irrespective of LR
preferences. Anticipating such a strategy of SRs, LR investor have no other choice but to trade
in a delayed equilibrium.
Before we proceed further, we rule out an uninteresting case of pooling delayed trading
equilibria, where SRs sell all of their assets regardless of type, by assuming that the discount
parameter δ is such that:
A4. δ > η.
Indeed, on one hand, the delayed equilibrium price Pd cannot exceed the actuarilly fair value
of ηρ for LRs to be willing to buy. On the other hand, the value of good assets to an SR is δρ, if
he does not sell them. Consequently, assumption (A4) guarantees that δρ > Pd, and hence SRs
strictly prefer not to sell any good assets in equilibrium. Thus, our focus, as in Bolton et al, is
on non-trivial delayed equilibria, where both neutral and bad assets are sold. SRs are willing to
sell their neutral assets provided
Pd ≥ ηρδ. (10)
This condition is also necessary to get investment in the risky asset in the first place.
We now demonstrate why BSS delayed equilibria with both SR and LR agents preferring to
trade at t = 2 break down in our modification of BSS economy. Let P1 be the t = 1 price in a
delayed equilibrium, so that SRs prefer to trade at t = 2. SRs’ objective function in (5) implies
that trading at date t = 2 will be preferred whenever price P1 is sufficiently low, so that the
following inequality is satisfied:
P1 < qηρδ+ (1− qη)Pd. (11)
Similarly, the LRs objective function implies that LRs prefer to trade at t = 2 if their expected
return from trading at t = 2, conditional on both neutral and bad assets being traded at t = 2,
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exceeds the expected return from an early trade. Similarly to BSS (2010) this leads to the
following condition:
(1− q)ηρ
(1− qη)Pd
≥
ηρ
P1
, (12)
where (1 − q)/(1 − qη) is the conditional probability of buying a neutral asset at t = 2 given
that inequality (10) is satisfied, and hence both bad and neutral assets are traded at t = 2. It
can easily be verified that inequalities (10)–(12) cannot hold simultaneously, and hence, there is
no delayed equilibrium in which LRs would prefer to trade at t = 2. Indeed, the last inequality
implies that (1 − q)P1 ≥ (1 − qη)Pd, which in conjunction with (11) yields P1 < ηρδ. The two
latter inequalities (1− q)P1 ≥ (1− qη)Pd and P1 < ηρδ then jointly imply that Pd < ηρδ, which
contradicts inequality (10) guaranteeing that neutral assets are traded at t = 2. Thus, we have
proven the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. In a delayed trading equilibrium (where P1 is sufficiently low, so that SRs prefer
trading at t = 2), an LR would actually prefer trading early as this would earn her a higher rate
of return.
This opposing preferences for the timing of trades is a significant departure, in terms of result,
from BSS (2010). It is driven by our assumption that after the economy experiences a liquidity
shock, assets that turn out to be good yet do not become perfectly liquid in a sense that good
assets at t = 2 do not pay off before t = 3. In contrast, in BSS (2010) there is a range of
examples, involving SRs choosing strictly positive money holdings m∗ > 0 in both early and
delayed trading equilibrium, and thus being indifferent vis-a-vis their payoffs across the two, in
which the LR agents strictly prefer to trade late, benefiting from being able to buy a subset of
a greater quantity of SR investment in the long-maturity assets in the delayed equilibrium, with
lower money holdings M∗d .
Given Lemma 1 above, the only case in which a delayed trading equilibrium could arise in our
setup is one where SR agents perceive that they will be strictly better off in such an equilibrium,
as compared to an early trading equilibrium. As a result, they withhold their supply of the long-
maturity asset from its market, until it is common belief that they have asymmetric information
about subsets of their portfolio, and would only be selling their average and bad quality assets.
In general, such a delayed equilibrium will be supported by a wide range of prices P1 satisfying
inequality (11). However, it is reasonable to consider only refined equilibria where P1 coincides
with an early trading equilibrium price, which reflects SRs belief that the deviation from a delayed
equilibrium strategy will result in an early trading equilibrium outcome. The following Lemma
allows us to impose further restrictions on the set of plausible delayed trading equilibria.
Lemma 2. SRs would never strictly prefer a Delayed trading equilibrium in which m∗ > 0, over
any early trading equilibrium. Such a delayed equilibrium would also make LR agents strictly
worse off than in early trading - unlike as in BSS (2010).
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Lemma 2 can easily be established by simply comparing the expected payoffs across the two
equilibria. An important implication of this Lemma is that it prompts us to look only for delayed
equilibria which entail m∗ = 0 for SRs, since otherwise SRs will be better off by switching to
early equilibria. For example, consider a set of parameters such that an early trading equilibrium,
described in Proposition 1 above, entails money holdings m∗ > 0 by SR agents, whereas delayed
equilibrium entailsm∗ = 0 for SRs. As noted in the discussion following Proposition 1, SR agents’
payoff in such an early equilibrium would be equal to piSR = 1, and hence be no more than if she
had invested only in the liquid asset, setting m = 1. In contrast, in a delayed equilibrium with
m∗ = 0, in which SRs invest all of their endowment in the long-maturity asset, their expected
payoff from so doing, [λρ+(1− λ){qηδρ+(1− qη)Pd}], must necessarily strictly exceed the unit
payoff from just holding the liquid asset, despite gains from trade given up (to the detriment of
LR agents’ payoffs) by SRs planning not to trade their better quality asset subsets.
Next, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a delayed trading
equilibrium withm∗ = 0 in which SRs expect to get price Pe(λ) = (1−λρ)/(1−λ) (price in early
trading equilibrium with m∗ > 0) if they deviate to an early trade. SRs would strictly prefer to
trade in this delayed trading equilibrium, as compared to any early equilibrium involvingm∗ > 0.
We proceed in two steps. First, we obtain an economically intuitive necessary condition under
which a non-trivial delayed trading equilibrium could conceivably exist. Then, we strengthen this
condition by deriving necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a delayed trading
equilibrium. Furthermore, we provide tractable exogenous bounds on the sets of model parame-
ters under which there exists a delayed trading equilibrium with desired properties.
In any non-trivial delayed equilibrium with Pd ≥ δηρ, SRs would only trade a proportion
(1− qη) of their long-maturity assets about which they get either bad or neutral news. To buy
these assets at the market clearing price Pd, LR investors would have to hold Md = (1 − qη)Pd
in liquid assets, on which they obtain the expected return of [λ+ (1− λ)(1− q)ηρ/(1− qη)Pd].
From LRs’ optimization we then obtain the following first order condition for the optimal choice
of Md in liquid assets:
F ′(K −Md) = λ+ (1− λ)
(1− q)ηρ
(1− qη)Pd
> 1. (13)
Combining the above inequality with the non-triviality condition Pd ≥ δηρ, we see that for any
λ it must be true that:
δ <
1− q
1− qη
< 1. (14)
In addition, a consistent equilibrium price Pd must be such that SR agents strictly prefer to trade
in the delayed equilibrium, rather than coordinating on an early one:
Pe(λ) =
1− λρ
1− λ
≤ qηδρ+ (1− qη)Pd(λ), (15)
where we have assumed that λ < λc, so that the early trading equilibrium entails m
∗ > 0 (see
Proposition 1). Combining the conditions (14) and (15) above, we can derive the following
16
Lemma which gives a necessary condition for the existence of a delayed trading equilibrium with
m∗ = 0:
Lemma 3. Define the “social surplus” per unit of the SR-created long-maturity asset,
S(λ) = [λρ+ (1− λ)ηρ− 1]. (16)
A necessary condition for the existence of a delayed trading equilibrium with m∗ = 0 is
S(λ) ≥ (1− λ)q2
1− η
1− qη
ηρ. (17)
Proof: see Appendix.
Under the maintained hypothesis that λ < λc, this necessary condition creates the possibility
of a lower bound λ∗, 0 < λ∗ < λc, such that the selected equilibrium would entail early trading
for all λ < λ∗, and delayed trading for λ > λ∗. Such direct dependence of the SR-selected timing
of trading, and hence implied equilibrium investment (1−m∗) in the SR-originated long-maturity
asset, is absent in the BSS (2010) paper. In contrast to our paper, in BSS (2010) framework
a delayed trading equilibrium is Pareto preferred by both agent types, albeit weakly by SRs if
m∗ > 0. The results of Lemma 3 are further strengthened in Proposition 2 below, which provides
both necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a delayed trading equilibrium with
m∗ = 0, assunimg λ < λc so that SRs expect to trade at a price Pe(λ) = (1− λρ)/(1− λ) if they
deviate and trade early (see Proposition 1).
Proposition 2. Condition (17) above, together with the condition in inequality (19) below, are
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a delayed trading equilibrium in which m∗, the liquid
asset holdings of the selling SR agents, equals zero. Defining:
Pmin =
Pe(λ)
1 + q(1− η)
, (18)
F ′(K − (1− qη)Pmin) <
[
λ+ (1− λ)
(1− q)ηρ
(1− qη)Pmin
]
. (19)
Moreover, there exist upper and lower bounds on δ, given by:
δ∗(λ) =
x
ηρ
, δ∗(λ) = max
{x
ρ
,
Pe(λ)− (1− qη)x
qηρ
}
, (20)
where x solves a nonlinear equation
F ′(K − (1− qη)x) = λ+ (1− λ)
ηρ(1− q)
(1− qη)x
, (21)
such that for all pairs {λ, δ} ∈
{
{λ, δ} : δ∗(λ) ≤ δ ≤ δ
∗(λ)
}
there exists a unique delayed
equilibrium with m∗ = 0 and price Pd = x ≥ Pmin which SRs prefer to an early equilibrium
with price Pe(λ). Furthermore, the length of the equilibrium existence interval on δ satisfies the
following inequality:
δ∗(λ)− δ∗(λ) < min
{
1− η,
1− q
q
}
. (22)
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Proof: See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique
delayed trading equilibrium and provides a tractable characterization of the equilibrium existence
regions. It also establishes a lower bound on the equilibrium price Pd, given by (18), which
guarantees that the equilibrium price is high enough to induce SRs to choose to trade late and
supply not only the lemons but also average quality assets. The existence region is characterized
in terms of upper and lower bounds (20) on the discount parameter δ. Intuitively, on one hand,
parameter δ should be sufficiently high to induce the SRs to trade at t = 2, so that they get
higher expected discounted payoff after receiving good news after t = 1. On the other hand, it
cannot be too high since otherwise Pd ≥ δηρ is violated and hence only lemons are traded in the
market. Consequently, the equilibrium exists only for δ in the medium range, bounded by some
δ∗ and δ
∗.
The results of Proposition 2 indicate that the bounds on parameter δ become tighter as η or
q increases. To understand the intuition we note that as η increases a good outcome becomes
more likely in the no-news state at t = 2. Therefore, for the delayed trade to be an equilibrium
outcome, SRs with no news should be more impatient to be willing to sell the asset at time t = 2.
Consequently, the upper bound δ∗ should decrease leading to the shrinkage of the interval for δ
supporting the delayed equilibrium. Furthermore, the interval for δ shrinks as q increases. The
reason is that higher q makes the no-news state less likely, increasing the proportion of lemons
traded at t = 2. Consequently, price Pd decreases, and the no-news SRs should be more impatient
(as measured by their δ) to sell assets at t = 2, and hence δ∗ should decrease reaching zero in
the limit.
From the results of Proposition 2 it can additionally be demonstrated that SRs prefer a
delayed equilibrium with m∗d = 0 to an early one with m
∗
e = 0 or m
∗
e > 0, so that pid ≥ pie, where
expected payoffs pid and pie are given by:
pid = λρ+ (1− λ)(qηρδ+ (1− qη)Pd), (23)
pie = m
∗
e + (1−m
∗
e)(λρ+ (1− λ)Pe). (24)
Consequently, the SRs choose to trade late, enforcing the delayed equilibrium.
To facilitate the numerical analysis, from Proposition 1 we observe that the early equilibrium
price Pe (required for the construction of bounds δ∗ and δ
∗) can conveniently be written as
follows:
Pe(λ) = max
{1− λρ
1− λ
, y
}
, (25)
where y solves a nonlinear equation:
F ′(K − y) =
{
λ+ (1− λ)
ηρ
y
}
. (26)
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Indeed, it follows from Proposition 1 that:
Pe(λ) =


1− λρ
1− λ
, if m∗e > 0,
y(λ), if m∗e = 0.
(27)
Moreover, from Proposition 1, M∗e < Pe when m
∗
e > 0, and hence from the first order condition
(6) and concavity of function F (·) it follows that F ′(K−Pe) ≥ λ+(1−λ)ηρ/Pe. Consequently, in
the early equilibrium with m∗e > 0 it can easily be demonstrated that Pe = (1− λρ)/(1− λ) ≥ y,
giving rise to expression (25). Expressions (20) for the bounds δ∗ and δ
∗ along with expression
(25) for the price in the early equilibrium allow for an efficient numerical computation of the
existence regions for delayed and early equilibria, which we describe in the next subsection.
3.3. Numerical Analysis
In this subsection we numerically explore the existence regions for different equilibria in {λ, δ}-
space, aggregate welfare across different equilibria and other relevant economic parameters. In
particular, we are interested in the regions where the delayed equilibrium with m∗d = 0 coexists
with early equilibrium with either m∗e > 0 or m
∗
e = 0. Our construction of these regions is based
on the bounds for discount parameter δ derived in Proposition 2. In addition to bounds δ∗ and
δ∗, we also note that assumption (A1) imposes the following upper bound on δ:
δ ≤ δ¯(λ) =
1− λρ
1− λ
1
ηρ
. (28)
From the results of Proposition 1 we note that (28) along with assumption (A3) are enough to
guarantee the existence of an early equilibrium.
For our numerical analysis we pick the following specification for LR investment technology,
satisfying all the conditions in Section 2:
F (I) =
K1−αIα
α
, (29)
where α ∈ (0, 1). Given the concavity of F (·) it can easily be demonstrated that the nonlinear
equations (21) and (26) have unique solutions x and y in terms of which the early Pe and delayed
Pd equilibrium prices are derived. We calculate x and y numerically, and by substituting them
into expressions (20) obtain the upper and lower bounds for δ as functions of λ.
The characterization of the existence regions in Proposition 2 allows us to calculate the lower
bound λ∗ for the benign state probability λ, such that the delayed equilibrium withm
∗ = 0 exists
(for some δ) whenever λ ≥ λ∗. The discussion in Proposition 2 implies that λ∗ can be obtained as
a solution to equation δ∗(λ∗) = δ
∗(λ∗). Similarly, the expression for the early equilibrium price
Pe in (25) can be employed to characterize the “switching point” λc, introduced in Proposition
1, which separates early equilibria with m∗ > 0 (when λ < λc) and early equilibria with m
∗ = 0
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(when λ ≥ λc). In particular, it can easily be demonstrated that parameters λ∗ and λc solve the
following equations:
x(λ∗) =
Pe(λ∗)
1 + q(1− η)
,
y(λc) =
1− λcρ
1− λc
,
(30)
where x and y in turn solve equations (21) and (26), and price Pe(λ) is given by (25).
Figure 2 shows the existence regions for delayed and early equilibria in {λ, δ}-space. For
the numerical calculations we use the following set of parameters: K = 2, ρ = 1.2, η = 1/ρ,
q = 0.3, and α = 0.75. The existence region for the delayed equilibrium with m∗d = 0 is the
region bounded from above by δ∗(λ) and δ¯(λ) and from below by δ∗(λ). The early equilibrium
exists for all parameters λ and δ such that δ ≤ δ¯(λ), and λc separates the equilibria with m
∗
e > 0
(when λ < λc) and the equilibria with m
∗
e = 0 (when λ ≥ λc).
The numerical calculations demonstrate that the existence regions for the delayed and early
equilibria overlap, and λ∗ < λc. Moreover, bounds δ∗(λ) and δ
∗(λ) turn out to be decreasing
functions of the good state probability λ. To explain this result, we note that the delayed price
Pd = x, where x solves equation (21), is a decreasing function of λ, which can be established by
differentiating equation (21) and showing that ∂x/∂λ < 0. Intuitively, as probability λ increases,
a bad shock at t = 1 becomes less likely. Since the SRs trade only conditional on observing the
bad state at t = 1, ex ante at t = 0 the probability of trade after t = 0 goes down. Therefore, LRs
face higher opportunity cost of holding liquidity M , preferring to invest more in their riskless
technology. Consequently, conditional on a bad shock at t = 1, SRs will face lower demand for
their assets both in early and delayed equilibria, and hence, the delayed and early prices are
decreasing functions of λ, which translates into decreasing bounds for δ.
The delayed equilibrium coexists with the early equilibrium with m∗e > 0 when λ ∈ [λ∗, λc]
and with the early equilibrium with m∗e = 0 when λ ≥ λc. The size of [λ∗, λc] interval depends
on the curvature of the technology function, −F ′′(I)I/F ′(I) = 1 − α, parameterized by α. To
investigate the sensitivity of the size of this region with respect to α we numerically calculate λ∗
and λc as functions of α. Figure 3 presents the results of the calculations and demonstrates that
the size of the region decreases as parameter α goes up.
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Figure 2: Existence Regions for Early and Delayed Equilibria.
This Figure shows the existence regions for early and delayed trading equilibria for parameters K = 2,
ρ = 1.2, η = 1/ρ, q = 0.3, and α = 0.75. The delayed equilibrium with m∗ = 0 exists for all {λ, δ}
such that δ∗ ≤ δ ≤ δ
∗, λ∗ ≤ λ ≤ 1/ρ. The early equilibrium with m
∗ > 0 exists for all {λ, δ} such that
δ ≤ δ∗
e
and 0 < λ ≤ λc, and the early equilibrium with m
∗ > 0 exists for all {λ, δ} such that δ ≤ δ∗
e
and
λc ≤ λ ≤ 1/ρ.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium λ∗ and λc as Functions of Curvature Parameter α.
This Figure plots parameters λ∗ and λc as functions of curvature parameter α for parameters K = 2,
ρ = 1.2, η = 1/ρ, q = 0.3. Delayed equilibria with m∗ = 0 and early equilibria with m∗ > 0 coexist if
λ∗ < λ < λc, while delayed equilibria withm
∗ = 0 and early equilibria withm∗ = 0 coexist if λc ≤ λ ≤ 1/ρ.
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We now investigate the welfare implications of our analysis. Given the significant overlap
of the existence regions it becomes important to compare the aggregate welfare across different
equilibria. We quantify the aggregate welfare by an expected total payoff defined as the sum of
the expected payoffs of LRs and SRs, denoted by Π and pi, respectively. The expected payoffs of
SRs are given by expressions (23) and (24) whereas for LRs the expected payoffs in delayed and
early equilibria take the following form:
Πd = F (K −Md) + λMd + (1− λ)
M
Pd
1− q
1− qη
ηρ, (31)
Πe = F (K −Me) + λMd + (1− λ)
M
Pe
ηρ. (32)
Figure 3 shows aggregate welfare in delayed and early equilibria for the model parametersK = 2,
ρ = 1.2, η = 1/ρ, q = 0.3, α = 0.75, and δ = 0.74.
The aggregate welfare functions are increasing in probability λ. Moreover, the aggregate
welfare in the early equilibrium exceeds that in the delayed equilibrium for each parameter λ. To
understand the economic intuition we note that SRs have higher expected payoff in the delayed
equilibrium with m∗d = 0 than in the early equilibrium. However, according to Lemma 2 they
do not have strict preference for a delayed equilibrium with m∗d > 0 over an early equilibrium.
Therefore, in the neighborhood of λ∗ their welfare will be almost unchanged by switching from
a delayed to an early equilibrium. Furthermore, according to Lemma 2 LRs are always strictly
better off in the early trading equilibrium, and hence, at least in the neighborhood of λ∗ the
aggregate welfare should be higher in the early equilibrium.
The fact that the aggregate welfare is higher in the early equilibrium can also rigorously be
demonstrated for λ ≥ λ∗. For the ease of exposition we demonstrate this only for the case when
m∗e = 0. In this case, from the expressions for SR and LR expected payoffs in (23), (24), (31),
and (31), as well as market clearing conditions Me = Pe and Md = (1− qη)Pd it follows that:
Πd + pid = λρ+ (1− λ)ηρ(1− q + qδ) + F (K −Md) +Md, (33)
Πe + pie = λρ+ (1− λ)ηρ+ F (K −Me) +Me. (34)
Comparing the expressions in (33) and (34) we observe that the sufficient condition for the
aggregate welfare to be higher in early equilibrium is that F (K −Me)+Me > F (K−Md)+Md,
or equivalently, given that F (K − M) +M is an increasing function, the sufficient condition
becomes Me > Md. To prove that Me > Md we note that the first order condition forMd in (13)
along with the market clearing condition Md = (1− qη)Pd imply the following inequality:
F (K −Md) < λ+ (1− λ)
ηρ
Md
. (35)
From the comparison of the above equation with the first order condition for Me in (7) and the
properties of technology function F (·) it can easily be demonstrated that Me > Md, and hence
the aggregate welfare is higher in an early equilibrium.
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Figure 4: Aggregate Welfare Across Early and Delayed Equilibria.
This Figure shows the aggregate welfare in delayed and early equilibria for parameters K = 2, ρ = 1.2,
η = 1/ρ, q = 0.3, and δ = 0.74. Πe + pie is the aggregate welfare of LRs and SRs in early equilibrium
while Πd + pid is the aggregate welfare of LRs and SRs in delayed equilibrium.
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Finally, Figure 5 shows Pe(λ∗) as a function of the parameter α for different levels of return
ρ, while the other parameters are as for the previous graphs. It turns out that this function
is an increasing function of the parameter α, as well as the return ρ. As demonstrated in the
subsequent part of the paper, Pe(λ∗) can be thought of as a government intervention price that
induces the SRs to switch to early trading equilibrium.
4. Strategy-Proofness, Immediate Trading, and Exuberant Pri-
ors
We now further explore the concept of delayed equilibrium introduced in Section 3. First, we
discuss the real-life evidence in support of the existence of delayed trades, and then address the
question of the strategy proofness of delayed trading equilibria. Specifically, we demonstrate that
these equilibria are not strategy-proof in a sense that there exist Pareto improving offers by LRs
that would induce SRs to switch to an early trade. Next, we reconcile the evidence in favor of
the existence of delayed trading with the non-strategy-proofness of delayed trading equilibria.
This reconciliation is achieved by introducing a realistic modification of our model in which
agents are additionally allowed to trade immediately at the initial date t = 0, and SRs can
potentially disagree on the probability of benign economic states, λ. We provide an example
which demonstrates that such a heterogeneity of beliefs results in market segmentation in which
some agents trade immediately at time t = 0 and some at t = 2, consistently with the anec-
dotal accounts of recent financial crisis. Finally, we remark that immediate trades play no role
in BSS (2010). Consequently, the possibility of immediate trading in conjunction with non-
strategy-proofness of delayed trading equilibria even further highlights the difference in economic
implications between our model and that of BSS (2010).
4.1. Immediate Trading
As we noted in the Introduction, in early 2008, even after some aggregate valuation shocks to the
mortgage backed securities market had occurred, in the opinion of the majority of participants,
highly levered institutions such as banks and investment banks continued to hold nearly two-
thirds in value of these assets on balance sheets. This suggests strongly that the SR agents were
not coordinating their planned trading of these assets with LR agents (such as insurance firms
and pension funds) on an early trading equilibrium. At the same time, it also appears to be the
case that such LR agents had acquired quite significant (nearly one third by value) proportional
stakes in such assets, or tranches, from SR originators over the period 2002-2007, before the fully
perceived aggregate shocks in housing market were revealed. It was not until mid-2007 that these
shocks lead to value declines and risk recognition on mortgage baked securities, culminating in
significant lowering of credit ratings on these securities. Since these trades occurred before the
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realizations of aggregate shocks, the period of asset acquisitions in 2002-2007 most naturally
maps into date t = 0 of our model. Accordingly, we label these acquisitions as immediate trades.
The immediate trading plays no role in the BSS (2010) model. Indeed, they note that it is
strictly sub-optimal for SRs and LRs to engage in such trades in their setting. Their reasoning is
simple: relative to an Early trading equilibrium, immediate trading, at a set of prices satisfying
Π(λ) = [λρ + (1 − λ)Pe] for SRs to be indifferent between trading at t = 0 and t = 1, would
simply serve to make LR agents worse off, by having to hold a strictly higher amount of liquidity
Md(λ) > Me(λ). As a result, any immediate trading equilibrium would result in strictly lower
origination of the tradable asset by SRs, leading to a (weakly) Pareto inferior outcome. A similar
argument applies vis-a-vis comparing a delayed vs an immediate trading equilibria in BSS (2010)
model, in which delayed trading equilibrium outcomes Pareto dominate those arising from early
trading, when the former exists.
4.2. Strategy-Proofness and Exuberant Priors
The latter argument no longer applies, vis-a-vis a delayed trading equilibrium, in the modified
setting of our model and, as a result, there is a clear possibility for a role for immediate trading
in our setup. However, at least given heterogeneous prior beliefs regarding the likelihood of an
(adverse) aggregate valuation shock across agents, not all SR agents would choose to engage
in immediate trading either, leading to the possibility of “segmented markets”, in which more
optimistic SR agents, along with LR agents with higher marginal liquidity holding costs, would
wait to trade assets in a delayed trading equilibrium instead. The reason such a possibility
arises in our setting is the following. Unlike in the BSS model, in which their delayed trading
equilibrium exhausts all feasible gains from trade across SR and LR agents, and hence is Pareto-
preferred by them to the early trading equilibrium, in our modified setup LR agents would have
strictly preferred trading early instead. Indeed, essentially because of this feature of our analysis,
it is easily shown that, being faced with the prospect of engaging in delayed equilibrium trade,
the LR agent could make herself and her SR trading partner better off at the margin by making
an offer to buy an unit of the latter’s assets early, at time t = 1, as well as initially at time
t = 0. In other words, our delayed trading equilibrium notion is simply not “strategy-proof”. The
following Lemma formalizes our intuition.
Lemma 4. Given a delayed trading equilibrium price Pd, there is always an early trade price
offer by an LR of Po > qηδρ+ (1− qη)Pd - that makes both her and her SR trading partner
strictly better off, via exchanging an unit of the asset at this price.
Proof: see Appendix.
At first sight, the lack of strategy proofness of our delayed equilibrium may lead to the
conclusion that the only valid competitive price-taking equilibrium outcomes in our setup could
25
be those which are associated with some early trading equilibrium. We take a more eclectic view,
by bringing into the consideration the possibility of Immediate trading offers, based on the same
idea as in Lemma 4 above. We then show, via an extended example, that if the LR agents’ offers
are based on a lower estimate of λ than that of a subset of SR agents, then the latter may not
find it profitable to sell their asset immediately, as compared to waiting to trade these at their
(conjectured) delayed trading equilibrium price Pd. What this example does not accomplish,
however, is the task of full integration of immediate trading based on bilateral offers by some SR
and LR agents, with others trading in a delayed, and price-taking equilibrium (with a Lemons
discount in prices) later on.
Example: Consider a scenario where ρ = 1.20, ηρ = 1, α = 0.87, δ = 0.84, q = 0.3, and Pd is such
that qηδρ+ (1− qη)Pd is between 0.892 and 0.9. LR agents, and some SRs as well, believe that
the ex ante probability of the benign state continuing is λp = 0.35, whereas as other “exuberant”
SR agents believe that it is λo = 0.45. Both beliefs are consistent with the conjecture that SR
agents would prefer to trade in a price-taking Delayed equilibrium over an Early trading one,
as Pe(λp) = [1− 1.2× 0.35/(1 − 0.35)] = 0.892 < 0.9. Suppose that LR agents are willing to
offer SR agents the equivalent of an early trading price of Po = 0.92 in their immediate offers,
amounting to offers of Π = 0.35× 1.2 + 0.65× 0.92 = 1.02. The exuberant SR agents would
prefer not to sell immediately at this price, as they conjecture that if they wait and then trade
in a Delayed equilibrium, at the price Pd, if and when the aggregate shock would occur, they
would obtain the ex ante (at t = 0) expected payoff of 0.55× 1.20 + 0.45× 0.892 = 1.03 > 1.02,
their offered immediate trading price. This gives rise to a market segmentation whereby assets
are traded at both t = 0, 2. Indeed, one may think of the post aggregate but pre idiosyncratic
private information state t = 1, as a conceptual rather than a “real time” state, when trading is
carried out.
5. Implications for Financial Crises
In this Section, building on the insights developed in the previous Sections, we provide a discussion
of financial crises and the design of regulatory policies. First, we point out the importance of
leverage for the funding of securitization during the recent crisis and discuss supporting evidence.
Then, we enrich our tractable example of the role of exuberance in Section 4.2 by incorporating
SR agents which are leveraged via repo contracts and choose the level of leverage based on the
immediate trading prices at t = 0. In the context of a simple numerical illustration we discuss
how the reassessment of the probabilities of economic shocks by initially exuberant agents may
unexpectedly decrease immediate trading prices, leading to a run by repo holders. In such a run
all agents rush to trade at t = 0 at sub-optimal prices. This trading at sub-optimal prices we use
as a definition of crises and explore potential ways of preventing them via policy regulation.
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5.1. Excessive Leverage and Crises
It is well known that the explosion of securitization of (potentially) lower quality and riskier
(more heterogeneous) loan products, especially over the years of 2002-7, was funded with much
higher (compared to that in other banking activities) and short-term uninsured debt, in the
form repo financing for example. It is also commonly accepted that market doubts about the
qualities of the underlying loans, which started accruing from late 2006 onwards, had negative
implications for the valuation of even higher grade securities (tranches). Eventually, this accrual
of doubts resulted in significant downgrades by credit rating agencies starting in early 2007, after
which both the rates paid and “haircuts” (margin requirements) demanded on the repo financing
increased, as documented in Gorton and Metrick (2009, 2010). However, this process was slow
in the beginning. In particular, while sales of new securities based on newly originated (by
now realized to be lower-grade) loans, to be funded via a lower extent of repo finance, essentially
ceased by mid-2007, the process of higher haircuts and rates on such repo financing crept upwards
from mid-2007 until the first quarter of 2008, before accelerating to basically full-fledged systemic
bank/repo runs during the summer of 2008.
In a magisterial review of the consequences and possible causes of the great financial crisis of
2008, Hellwig (2008) suggests that “we must distinguish between the contribution to systemic risk
that came from excessive maturity transformation through SIVs and Conduits (used by levered
banks to park their holdings of securitized products) and the contribution to systemic risk that
came from the interplay of market malfunctioning, fair value accounting, and the insufficiency of
bank equity”. What precisely did he mean by “market malfunctioning”? To us, based in part on
our reading of Hellwig (2008), “market malfunctioning” might imply at least the two following
aspects of agents’ behavior and its consequences for the “unforeseen nature” of some of the market
trades. The first, which Hellwig (2010) discusses under the heading of “excessive confidence in
quantitative models”, could account for basing leverage choices on currently prevailing levels
of the immediate trading prices of the assets, in a time such as that captured in our example
above, with a cushion for potential adverse shocks to prices based largely on very recent historical
changes (volatilities) in these.
For instance, in the context of our Example above, an “exuberant” SR who intends not to
sell her asset immediately, at the offered price of 1.02, may take on a leverage level of 0.95 per
unit of the asset, even if she reckons that - contingent on the aggregate shock (fully) realizing -
her overall delayed payoff (supportable with a mix of asset sales, and lower leverage on the good
subset held on to), is only 0.892. Implicit in such behavior is her belief or hubris that she would
have the capability to sell enough of her asset, prior to an aggregate shock fully manifesting
itself in its immediate trading price, to reduce her leverage ratio to 0.892, from 0.95. As Rajan
(2010) remarks, even Charlie Prince of Citicorp, to whom the by now notorious statement about
“keeping on dancing as long as the music is playing” is attributed, expressed a caveat regarding
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what might happen “if liquidity dried up” in secondary markets for securitized assets that Citi
was holding onto, including those it had carried on the books of its SIVs and Conduits, with
implicit promises of Citi supporting their debt liabilities via equity injections, if required. This
brings us to what we believe is a second important dimension of market malfunctioning and its
interactions with debt.
Suppose that, as say over the last two quarters of 2007, the less exuberant LR agents had
lowered their estimated likelihood of the benign aggregate state continuing, from 0.35 to 0.107, so
that their maximal price offer for immediate trading now decreased to 0.107× 1.2 + 0.893× 0.92 =
0.95, in the context of our Example above. As soon as that happens, repo holders of an SR who
had taken on the leverage level of 0.95 would start a Run, taking the immediate trading price
as the maximal liquidation value of the SR they had funded, as in the model of He and Xiong
(2009).7 If sufficiently many SRs, with similar leverage levels as well as absence of inside liquid-
ity m∗ to finance such withdrawals, then try to sell ALL of their assets immediately, that would
lower market prices, ultimately to a level equalling δηρ, at which point the secondary market will
collapse, and remain so into period t = 2, when asymmetric information about qualities of offered
assets takes hold. The reason is, of course, that the liquidity available from LR agents for buying
these assets equals at most - because some had bought the asset earlier in immediate trading
from less exuberant SRs - the level required to support a price level of Pd, for a volume/measure
(1− qη) units of assets to be sold in Delayed trading. It would thus not suffice even to support
the price level of Pe(λ∗) in the Run.
Note that, when one introduces the possibility of endogenous leverage as above, one must
specify what one means by the aggregate availability of funds in the SR Sector. One specification
is that this amount (normalized to unity above) represents the maximum amount of equity and
debt funds this sector can raise in the aggregate, with any overall mix of debt and equity that it
chooses. The other interpretation, as noted by Rajan (2010) and others, is one that arises from
“global imbalances” leading to much savings being available in economies without sophisticated
financial markets, which clamors for (even ostensibly) “safe” investment products, thereby en-
hancing the debt funding capacity of institutions such as the SRs in our model, which are then
constrained - given a pre-specified level of equity capital - only via some acceptable maximum
(possibly regulated) leverage ratio, vis-a-vis aggregate funding capacity. In our interpretation,
this distinction may be of importance, in terms of regulatory policy.
7If on the other hand the book Leverage Ratio chosen by Optimistic SRs were 0.99, when Offered immediate
Price was 1.02 – market debt to equity ratios of 33 were observed in 2007-8 – then relatively Pessimistic LR’s
lambda beliefs would only have to decline from 0.35 to 0.25, in order to cause Repo Runs by the short-term debt
holders of the more optimistic SRs, as 0.25× 1.2 + 0.75× 0.92 = 0.99 (see He and Xiong (2009)).
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5.2. Regulatory Policies
Twomajor regulatory policy interventions that are natural to consider in our setting areminimum
capital, or equivalently maximum leverage, ratio restrictions, as well as minimum asset price
Guarantees, possibly coupled with restrictions on Liquidity ratiosm∗ ex ante. Let us first consider
the former. One may set a maximum leverage ratio on investments in the risky technology to be
Pe(λ∗) = qηδρ+ (1− qη)Pd(λ∗), in which λ∗ represents, as before, the switch point above which
SR agents would prefer the delayed over the early trading equilibrium. Without much detailed
knowledge of the LR agents’ opportunity cost function for providing liquidity to the asset market,
or F (I), this would not be an easy policy to implement: doing so based on the lowest λ that
satisfies our necessary condition in Lemma 3 above, will result in a too generous leverage ratio
which may result in runs as above. Even if a regulator has the informational capacity to calculate
λ∗, there are still two potential difficulties. For λ > λ∗, Pd(λ) in Delayed trading equilibrium
with m∗ = 0 would be decreasing in λ, as with a set of Early trading equilibrium with m∗ = 0,
for λ > λc > λ∗, as described in Proposition 1 and its Corollary above. On the other hand,
if the regulatory maximum leverage ratio is set at the level of say Pe(λu), that may be overly
restrictive in terms of decreasing the pledgeable value arising from securitizing assets. In our
Example above, that would mean decreasing the maximum allowed leverage ratio from say 0.815
to [(1− 0.6× 1.2)/(1− 0.6)] = 0.70, which is not required.
In any event, a maximal leverage ratio will not prevent the planned trading strategies of at
least a subset of SR agents – all assigning probabilities λ > λ∗ to the aggregate adverse shock
not occurring – being delayed trading coupled with no inside liquidity holding (setting m = 0),
since there would not be enough external liquidity to absorb so much of risky assets in Immediate
or early equilibrium trading. As we have noted above, such delayed trading - in our model, as
opposed to that of BSS (2010) - would lead to part of the feasible gains from trade between SR
and LR agents being unrealized, decreasing (in our numerical simulations) payoffs aggregated
over them.
An alternative regulatory tool, analyzed in the BSS paper, would be for the regulator – with
access to fiscal or monetary powers - to provide a minimum price guarantee on the asset. The
purpose of such a guarantee in our setting would be the opposite of what it is in the BSS setting,
which is to support a delayed trading equilibrium when private liquidity provision by LR agents,
in the face of the lemons discount in pricing given adverse selection, is insufficient to support it.
Our price guarantee will apply to only Early trading, at a level Pe(λ∗), or for Immediate trading
at an unit price. For λ < λ∗, no SR agent would (strictly) prefer to sell to the regulator at
these prices. Instead, they would invest and trade as in the BSS Early trading equilibrium, with
m∗ > 0, or implement an immediate trading equilibrium with a higher level of m∗. However, in
these states, they would not be constrained by (overly restrictive, see above) leverage regulations.
Indeed, now even when LR agents would believe that λ > λ∗, they would plan to sell their assets
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early, and thus the possibility of Runs of the sort we outlined above would not arise; LR agents
would have no reason to make immediate trading offers that are more advantageous to SRs.
However, SR agents would invest - given the simple linear-in-payoffs expected utility functions
we have assumed - all of their funding capacity in the long-term asset, settingm∗ = 0. As a result,
some of the sales of assets originated by SR agents would indeed be to the regulator/government,
since private external liquidity provide by LR agents would not suffice to support such a price for
this volume of asset sales. If the regulator’s marginal cost of providing such liquidity is no lower
than that of LR agents at the hypothetical Early equilibrium for these levels of λ, the regulator
may seek to couple such a price support with minimum liquidity ratios. A tight one would be at
m∗(λ∗) and a looser one would be at m
∗(λu) provided the latter is indeed non-zero, i.e., λu < λc
in Proposition 1 above. In setting the level of this minimum Liquidity ratio, optimal regulatory
policy would thus need to trade off governmental (deadweight or opportunity) costs of providing
asset price support, for excessive asset origination at levels of λ in the neighborhood of λ∗, as
against constraining such asset origination excessively when λ is closer to λu >> λ∗.
Maximum leverage ratios could, however, lead to additional advantageous effects via another,
a “general equilibrium” channel, if one assumes that levels of equity capital available to SR
institutions is limited, and hence leverage regulations would serve to reduce the overall funding
capacity of such agents, relative to that of LR agents. In that case, conditions may be created
such that we would have Early trading outcomes in which we would have m∗ = 0 for lower levels
of λc, possibly lower than λ∗, such that SR agents would thereby obtain an interior share of the
surplus created by asset origination in Early trading equilibrium as well, for all λ in (λ∗, λu]. In
that event, they would be less likely to be tempted to carry out trading in a Delayed equilibrium,
thus eliminating the possibility of excessive asset and leverage creation, and Runs.
Finally, we should note another recent contribution, by Diamond and Rajan (2010), which
also has the feature that banks – funded with short-maturity demandable liabilities – may trade
their assets late rather than earlier, even if earlier trading would have preserved their solvency.
In their model, such a phenomenon arises owing to decisions being made by (in the interest of)
the levered equity holders of banks, who realize that – given the pattern of anticipated prices
in the secondary market for their assets – they would be unable to fully repay their depositors
even after asset sales in future, contingent on a “liquidity shock” leading a fraction of these
to withdraw earlier. These choices give rise to the possibility of (avoidable) Runs in the high
interim liquidity-demand state. They also discuss alternative regulatory interventions, including
their impact on banks’ chosen trading strategies.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have developed a model with asymmetrically informed short-run originators
and long-run buyers of financial assets, inspired by BSS (2010). In contrast to the latter paper,
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we assume different timing of asset payoffs. In particular, while in our model all the payoffs
are paid at the terminal date, in BSS (2010) the assets may pay at the intermediate date. We
have provided an exhaustive characterization of early and delayed trading equilibria, and derived
necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence. We have also argued that the difference
in the structure of payments between our paper and BSS (2010) translates into dramatically
different economic implications. In particular, in contrast to findings in BSS (2010) we find that
the delayed trading equilibria are not robust to Pareto-improving early trades. We have shown
that delayed trades can only be rationalized in an extended economy with immediate trades at
t = 0 and exuberant investors. Finally, our analysis yields new insights on financial crises and
policy regulation. Specifically, we have discussed how a crisis can originate within a setting with
SR agents leveraged via repo contracts, when the reassessment of the probability of aggregate
shocks by exuberant agents leads to a run resulting in sub-optimal prices.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Corollary 1. Consider LR’s expected return on money holding M as a function of
λ, R(λ):
R(λ) = λ+ (1− λ)
ηρ
Pe(λ)
, (a.1)
which in the segment λ in [λd, λc), in part (i) of the Proposition, implies that:
R(λ) = λ+ ηρ
(1− λ)2
1− λρ
. (a.2)
It is straightforward to show, via differentiation, that the right hand side of (a.2) is strictly
increasing in λ, which using LR’s optimality condition (7) yields the result.8
For the second part of the corollary, concerning the region [λc, λu) in which money holdings
m∗ of SRs equals zero, so that M∗e (λ) = Pe(λ), suppose to the contrary that M
∗
e (λ), and thus
Pe(λ) are (weakly) increasing in λ. But, then R(λ) would be strictly decreasing in λ, which
would contradict LRs’ optimality condition, in equation (7).
Finally, the statement that LRs’ overall expected payoff is increasing (vs decreasing) in λ
whenever M∗e (λ) is increasing (vs decreasing) in λ, is implied by the axioms of Revealed Prefer-
ence, applied to LR’s objective function, described in equation (2). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Conditions (15) and Pd ≥ δηρ, required for a delayed equilibrium, together
imply
S ≥ (1− λ)[(1− δ)ηρ− q(1− η)δηρ]. (a.3)
Which, upon substitution for {δ, (1−δ)} from the inequality (14), implies inequality (17). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Given a Pd, the commonly held conjecture of SR and LR agents about
Delayed trading equilibrium price, at the margin an LR agents would be indifferent between
reducing her planned trade at t = 2 by an unit, and making an offer to use the liquidity freed up
to buy Pd/Po units of an SR’s asset early, at the unit price Po equalling;
Po = Pd
(1− qη)
(1− q)
. (a.4)
The SR agent who is offered this price would be strictly better off by selling early if:
Po > qηδρ+ (1− qη)Pd, (a.5)
which holds provided
ηδρ < Pd
1− qη
1− q
(a.6)
8It is easily shown that:
dR(λ)
dλ
=
h
1− η
n (1− λρ)2 − (1− ρ)2
(1− λρ)2
oi
> 0.
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Inequality (a.6) holds for Pd > δηρ, which is true of any non-trivial Delayed trading equilibrium.
In contrast, in the BSS model, the analogue of (a.6) would require that:
ηρ < Pd
(1− qη)
(1− q)
(a.7)
which contradicts the LR agent’s First Order Condition for optimality, in equation (13). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We first observe that if there exists a delayed equilibrium with
m∗ = 0 then the market clearing condition implies that Md = (1 − qη)Pd. Substituting the
expression for liquidity Md into LR’s first order condition (13) in delayed equilibrium we obtain
that the price Pd in delayed equilibrium is given by Pd = (1− qη)x, where x solves a nonlinear
equation (21).
By comparing the payoffs from early and delayed trades we obtain the following condition
guaranteeing that SRs prefer to trade late:
Pe ≤ qηρδ + (1− qη)Pd, (a.8)
where Pe denotes the early equilibrium price that the SRs expect to see if they switch to early
trade. The expression on the right-hand side of (a.8) represents the expected gain from the
delayed trade conditional on observing a bad shock at t = 1.
Moreover, if there exists a delayed equilibrium with m∗ = 0 then Pd should satisfy the
following two inequalities:
Pd ≥ ηρδ, Pd ≤ ρδ. (a.9)
Indeed, if the first inequality in (a.9) is violated only lemons are traded at time t = 2, which
is not consistent with having a non-trivial delayed equilibrium. The second inequality in (a.9)
guarantees that the SRs receiving good news at t = 2 do not trade the assets (as discussed in
Section II). Substituting Pd = (1− qη)x into the inequalities (a.8) and (a.9) and rewriting them
as inequalities on x we obtain the following inequality:
max
{
ηρδ,
Pe(λ)− qηρδ
1− qη
}
≤ x(λ) ≤ ρδ. (a.10)
The inequality (a.10) imposes restrictions on {λ, δ} in equilibrium. Resolving the inequality
(a.10) with respect to δ we obtain an equivalent inequality:
δ∗(λ) ≤ δ ≤ δ
∗(λ), (a.11)
where δ∗ and δ
∗ are given in (20).
So far, the inequality (a.11) has been derived as a necessary condition for the existence of the
delayed equilibrium. However, we observe that this inequality is equivalent to inequality (a.10)
which also gives a sufficient condition for the existence of a delayed equilibrium. Indeed, x solves
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a nonlinear equation (21) and Pd = x defines the price in the delayed equilibrium since all the
equilibrium conditions are satisfied. In particular, from (a.10) it follows that inequalities (a.8)
and (a.9) are satisfied, and hence under the price Pd the SRs prefer to trade late. Moreover,
noting that Md = (1− qη)Pd we rewrite the non-linear equation (21) as follows:
F ′(K −Md) = λ+ (1− λ)
ηρ(1− q)
(1− qη)Pd
, (a.12)
which gives the FOC for LRs. Therefore, Md defined as Md = (1 − qθ)Pd indeed gives the
optimal liquidity level chosen by LRs that anticipate the delayed equilibrium. This completes
the proof that inequality (a.11) defines both necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of a delayed equilibrium.
The uniqueness of the delayed equilibrium follows from the properties of production function
F (·). Since F (·) is an increasing and concave function the left-hand side of the equation (21)
for x is a monotonically increasing function of x on the interval (0, K) and goes to infinity as
x→ K. On the other hand, the right-hand side of (21) is a monotonically decreasing function x
which becomes infinite when x→ 0. Therefore, there exists the unique solution of equation (21)
defining the price Pd.
We now demonstrate that the inequality (19) presents an equivalent way of rewriting the
necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the delayed equilibrium. From the inequality
(a.11) on δ we observe that the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of equilibrium
is given by the inequality δ∗(λ) ≥ δ∗(λ) which implies that there exists at least one equilibrium
pair {λ, δ} satisfying inequality (a.11). By comparing δ∗(λ) and δ∗(λ) in (20) we obtain that the
inequality δ∗(λ) ≥ δ∗(λ) is equivalent to the following inequality:
x
ηρ
≥
Pe − (1− qη)x
qηρ
.
Resolving the above inequality with respect to x we obtain that the necessary and sufficient
condition for the existence of the delayed equilibrium is given by x ≥ Pmin, where Pmin is defined
in Proposition 2. Thus, we obtain an exogenous lower bound Pmin on the delayed equilibrium
price. Since F ′(K− (1−qη)x) is an increasing function of x the inequality x ≥ Pmin is equivalent
to the inequality (19) in Proposition 2. Therefore, the inequality (19) gives a necessary and
sufficient condition for the existence of delayed equilibrium.
We also note that the necessary condition for the existence of a delayed trading equilibrium
(17), derived in Lemma 2, is implied by the inequality (19). To demonstrate this, we first observe
that F ′(K− (1− qη)x) > 1 by assumption. Therefore, the left-hand side of the equation (21) for
x exceeds unity. Consequently, from (21) we obtain the following upper bound on price Pd:
Pd ≤
(1− q)ηρ
1− qη
. (a.13)
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Noting that the early equilibrium price satisfies inequality Pe ≥ (1 − λρ)/(1− λ) allows us to
rewrite the inequality Pd ≥ Pmin as follows:
Pd ≥
Pe
1 + q(1− η)
≥
1− λρ
1− λ
1
1 + q(1− η)
. (a.14)
The inequalities (a.13) and (a.14) imply that:
1− λρ
1− λ
1
1 + q(1− η)
≤
(1− q)ηρ
1− qη
.
After simple algebraic manipulations it can easily be demonstrated that the above inequality is
tantamount to the necessary condition (17).
Finally, we prove the inequality (22) that gives an upper bound on the size of the interval for
the discount δ that supports the delayed trading equilibrium. In particular, from the expressions
for the upper and lower bounds for δ in (20) we obtain:
δ∗ − δ∗ ≤
x
ηρ
−
x
ρ
=
x
ρ
1− η
η
. (a.15)
Combining the inequality (a.15) with the inequality (a.13) we obtain:
δ∗ − δ∗ ≤
(1− q)(1− η)
1− qη
=
(1− q)(1− η)
1− q + q(1− η)η
=
1
1
1−η
+ q
1−q
≤ min
{
1− η,
1− q
q
}
.
The above inequality demonstrates that the equilibrium existence region shrinks as η → 1 or
q → 1. Q.E.D.
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